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iv Table of What should the US operational commander do? How would the US defend our ally, Taiwan, against the newly emerged PRC super-power 120 miles to the west?
Political and military developments may coincide to determine the nature of a PRC invasion of Taiwan. New generations of people with no ties to mainland China have been rising to power in Taiwan. This new pro-independence movement is sufficiently strong that after President Bush rebuked Taiwanese President Chen for being "willing to make a unilateral change in the cross-strait situation," 3 Chen used the rebuke to garner additional pro-independence supporters. President Chen and independence supporters clearly demonstrate that they are not only willing to stand up to China, but also to the US. 4 With
Chen's recent re-election, the PRC and Taiwan appear headed for a political showdown.
World focus will remain on China until end of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games.
This focus will likely limit PRC reaction to any Taiwanese calls for independence and nationalism. 5 At the same time, Taiwan's independence movement would continue to grow and may be further fueled by the Olympics. "Beijing's hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games will greatly challenge the ethnic and national identification of the Taiwan people." 6 Any political face-off during this time period would coincide with several advanced PRC military systems estimated to enter service. 7 The real danger post-2008 might be that "escalating 3 Peterson, "Dangerous Games across the Taiwan Strait," 26. 4 Ibid., 26. tensions between China and Taiwan, submerged by Olympic goodwill, may then erupt so rapidly that the US will have little time to adapt." 8 This political situation could trigger a short duration conflict.
Although there are several scenarios by which the PRC could attempt its national goal of reunification with Taiwan, the most challenging for the US operational commander would be the short duration conflict scenario. The PRC, working under an exercise ruse, would preposition its amphibious and naval forces; begin with a complete missile barrage of Taiwan; then follow with an amphibious assault. The PRC campaign objective would be to militarily force Taiwanese capitulation prior to US intervention. Several "observers believe that China's military modernization is aimed at fielding a force that can succeed in a short duration conflict with Taiwan that finishes before the US is able to intervene, so that China can present the US and the rest of the world with a fait accompli." 9 In this scenario, the US would not have enough warning to mobilize completely, but have sufficient notification to assemble US theater assets. US national objectives for the operational commander would be to defend Taiwan and deter the PRC from further action.
In a PRC short duration conflict attack scenario, the US operational commander must focus all efforts toward gaining air superiority starting in a small area of interest located about northwest Taiwan in order to use air power to destroy or deter the large PRC amphibious task force. All other military efforts should focus on aircraft carrier task forces protection.
Following an examination of operational assumptions and factors, this paper will detail the course of action, draw conclusions, and make recommendations.
OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS
In this 2010 scenario, assume the US can deploy two carrier task forces, four attack submarines and one USAF air wing (72 F-15s from Kadena AB, Japan) to the Taiwan Strait area of operations. 10 Second, the PRC will not initially resort to nuclear war. Third, the PRC will not launch a "people's war" of insurgency, although "fifth column" operations might degrade Taiwan's ability to respond. For simplification, assume Taiwan incapable of any power projection due to the massive initial rocket assault. Also, the PRC military modernization would have advanced 11 and feature several key systems recently becoming operational.
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Operational Factor: Time
In a short duration conflict scenario, the amphibious invasion surface force would be the PRC's center of gravity. The scenario places the force approximately 60 nautical miles (nm) from Taiwan along the middle line (see Figure 1) Figure 2) at this location. 15 The amphibious invasion force would be made up of several types of ships. Crucial ships for PRC power projection would be the tank-carrying ships necessary to overpower the Taiwanese beach defenses. These large amphibious tankcarrying ships would be the PRC critical vulnerability for this scenario.
The Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has increased amphibious ship production to address current lift deficiencies, and is now building three new classes of amphibious ships. 16 The majority of the 43 (current number, see Figure 3 , approximately 81
by 2010) 17 tank-carrying landing ships would need to get to the beach in a short period. One can assume this force, along with hundreds of smaller personnel ships, will maintain some type of formation with escort ships providing protection as well as fire coordination for the final beach assault. Several critical amphibious ships have a maximum speed of 14 knots.
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After considering tactical and evasion maneuvering, large numbers of the critical ships would have an average speed of 12 knots. Therefore, after an all out missile attack, the amphibious force would need 5 hours to reach the coast of Taiwan. Additionally, the PLAN will take an estimated 5 hours, under combat conditions, to offload the ships. 19 The PRC center of gravity for the operation (the estimated 81 heavy amphibious ships) will be vulnerable for 5 hours crossing the Strait and 5 more hours while the ships are offloaded on the beach.
Summarizing the operational factor, time, for the short duration conflict scenario, the PRC In general, there are beaches along the western shores of Taiwan suitable for an amphibious landing. 23 No matter where PRC forces land, they would surely maneuver north on Taiwan along the less mountainous western side of the island (see Figure 4) . If the Chinese land in southern Taiwan, it would allow more time for the US and Taiwan to concentrate firepower on the invasion force as it advanced on Taipei. There are also potential "choke points" limiting PRC maneuverability where outnumbered defense forces could "bottleneck" any south to north invasion of Taiwan.
Based on the different lines of operation from the landing beaches to Taipei, the most likely location for an amphibious landing would be northwest Taiwan. No matter where the PRC force lands it would be critical for the Chinese to deny US air access to northwest Taiwan because Taipei would be the final objective. The airspace around the northwest tip of Taiwan (see Figure 1 ) would be a critical area of interest for the US operational commander and the decisive point where the US would need to gain air superiority.
Operational Factor: Force
Knowing the exact location where the US would need to achieve air superiority is important, because PRC strategic surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and naval SAMs could be a decisive factor in negating US air superiority. In the Taiwan Strait, specifically in the "area of interest" outlined before, the PRC would have three effective means to interfere with US air superiority: lethal SA-20 strategic SAMs, land-based fourth-generation fighters, and long range naval SAMs on a Surface Action Group (SAG). These three forces would form the critical Chinese "anti-access" triangle against US airpower. While the land based SA-20s are relatively fixed and hindered by geography, the SAG, with long range offensive and defensive air defense systems could position themselves anywhere in the Straits. The PRC will choose to maneuver this critical SAG to provide the amphibious force operational protection from US airpower.
The Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has been modernizing for some time and will continue to do so prior to 2010. They could attack the US air defense of the area of interest with over 700 fighters and bombers without need of refueling. 24 Although the USAF might possess force multipliers in terms of training and weapons, the numerical imbalance makes it likely the PLAAF could overwhelm US air power over northwest Taiwan during certain periods of time in the scenario.
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The PRC has recently deployed a number of SA-20's along the Taiwan Strait. It will soon acquire the S-300PMU2 version of the SA-20, extending attack range to 108 nm.
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This added range might allow the PRC to shoot down aircraft over parts of Taiwan (see Figure 2 ). This version of the SA-20 does not have over-the-horizon capability. The Russian S-400 Triumf variant of the SA-20, currently in development, is believed to have an over-the-horizon capability with a 216 nm range. 27 PRC procurement of the S-400 version would signify a considerable increase in capability, and would allow the PRC to destroy aerial targets on the east side of Taiwan. Because Russia does not currently plan to export the S-400, 28 it can be assumed China will have only the S-300PMU2 variant for this scenario. This version, limited by the curvature of the earth, would allow US air forces to operate below this radar's horizon (see Figure 5 ). amphibious forces from 3,000 feet, the effective range of the SA-20's radar becomes 80 nautical miles, decreasing its operational reach. 29 By comparing this range to the area of interest (see Figure 6 ), one can determine that US strike aircraft can attack the invasion force from 3,000 feet to avoid any threat from the SA-20. A "high altitude" covering (air) force, for protection from PLAAF fighters would still be necessary. This horizon "wedge" supports current thinking about PRC power projection capabilities today; they currently cannot adequately defend their invasion fleet. 30 The vital operational change by 2010 will be the Chinese procurement of an SA-N-20.
The LUZHOU class destroyer, to be commissioned in 2007, 31 will house an SA-N-20 air defense system; representing a quantum leap in anti-access capability for the PLAN.
The LUZHOU SAG, featuring two LUZHOUs and two LUYANGs 32 with several escort destroyers, would be able to position itself much closer to the area of interest (see Figure 7 ).
This proximity to the area of interest negates potential US "wedge" operations described previously. Therefore, these PRC long range naval SAMS possess the operational reach to deny US air superiority in the area of interest. In addition to significant offensive capabilities, these SAMs have the capability to intercept inbound short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air-to-surface missiles for self-protection. 33 The SAG, operating co-operatively, could create a multi-layered defensive umbrella, countering US standoff weapons. Despite the impressive air defense capabilities of the SAG, only four ships (2 LUZHOUs and 2 LUYANGs) would have the operational reach to deny US air 29 Calculation follows: Distance a radar can see=1.23 *(√(altitude of target aircraft in feet) + √(altitude of radar antenna)). Assuming 3,000 feet operating altitude for US aircraft and the SA-20 target radar antenna at 100 feet, results in (1.23*(√(3,000)+ √(100))=79.7 nm. Formula from "Radar Horizon: superiority in the area of interest and only the four SAM systems on these ships would need to be neutralized as the first step toward US air superiority.
In summary, an assessment for this scenario depicts several challenges for a US operational commander. The commander would need to gain air superiority over the area of interest as rapidly as possible. Once the arranging operation to achieve local air superiority concludes, a mere 10 hours would be available to destroy PRC center of gravity, the amphibious invasion fleet. In order to attain local air superiority, US forces must defeat or avoid three PRC forces: the SA-20 strategic SAMs, the PLAAF air units, and most importantly the LUZHOU (SA-N-20) SAG.
SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION
The US operational commander should use attack submarines and air power to gain Examining specifics in this COA, the selected the area of interest will determine the initial placement of US attack submarines (see Figure 7 ). These submarines, integrating all available intelligence, should locate and track the LUZHOUs and LUYANGs in the SAG as soon as possible. When combat operations begin; the submarines could have the first attack opportunity. These attack submarines might be a vital force multiplier in this scenario because if they are successful in destroying their targets, more naval strike aircraft will be available to attack the amphibious force. If the initial submarine positioning (see Figure 7) , based on the northwest Taiwan COG assumption, proves incorrect, the subs would need to maneuver and may never (in 5 hours) be in a position to engage the SAG prior to the amphibious group landing and offloading. As mentioned before, the further south on Taiwan the PRC amphibious force lands, the more time US/Taiwan forces would have to attack the disembarked PLA forces.
There are several pros and cons for the submarine portion of the COA. The sinking of the key anti-access ships at the very beginning of the invasion may be sufficient to deter the PRC from further action. Although the PRC would have already paid a high political price for an all out missile attack against Taiwan, they might turn around the (now poorly defended) amphibious force to immediately de-escalate the conflict between the two superpowers. Any PRC decision to continue the invasion after its protection force were destroyed would send a clear signal to US national leadership about PRC resolve, warning of even greater potential military escalation. The submarine attack against the SAG would leverage the US strength (undersea warfare) against PLAN weakness (anti-submarine warfare). 34 On the negative side, this operation could place some risk on the attack submarines, which will not have the advantage of knowing the timing of the overall PRC attack, giving the SAG (if they detect the submarines) the initiative for attack.
If the submarines could not destroy the four key ships in the SAG, carrier based strike aircraft would need to attack. With two carrier task forces in this scenario, limited strike sorties would be available. Assuming 1.5 hours per "cycle" 35 (takeoff to takeoff for each group of sorties), there would be six possible "cycles" in this scenario. Every sortie used to destroy the SAG would be taken from destroying the amphibious landing group. A well timed, choreographed, attack on the SAG using simultaneous standoff weapon and decoys would be necessary to overwhelm the SAG's very capable air defenses.
Looking at the air attack component of the COA, on the positive side, air power will be agile enough to mass and attack wherever the LUZHOU SAG operates within the theater of operations. On the negative side, critical sorties would be lost from the main effort against the amphibious force. Additionally, naval stand off weapons may be successfully destroyed by the very capable PLAN destroyer air defenses, which ultimately would require more sorties to be re-allocated away from the main effort on the amphibious group.
Once the anti-access SAG component is negated, the operational commander should now focus all efforts on destroying the amphibious attack force from the air. If national authorities would allow the commander to destroy the SA-20's on mainland China, there will be no beneath the radar "wedge" operations required for strike aircraft. The air war would look almost two-dimensional with US offensive counter air forces pushing the PLAAF just west enough to allow US Navy strike aircraft to operate in the area of interest. If the operational commander could not target the mainland SA-20s due to fear of escalation, strike aircraft operations would be forced to lower altitudes. PRC SAM and AAA capable destroyers would pose a noteworthy threat to lower flying strike aircraft during "below the wedge" operations. US strike aircraft would need to destroy these PLAN destroyers first, with standoff weapons and tactics. Although the higher altitude protection aircraft cannot themselves push into the SAM ring (see Figure 2) , they can still defend the lower flying strike aircraft by engaging any PLAAF fighters at maximum air-to-air missile range.
The key component to both previously discussed scenarios is that air superiority would not need to be constant. The US counter air forces may, at times, be overwhelmed by superior PLAAF numbers. What would be important for the MI operation to be successful is to have local air superiority when and only when the naval strike aircraft are engaging the amphibious surface group. Thus, air planners would be able to maintain the offensive by choosing the timing of the air counter-offensive. Naval strike air packages could form up east of Taiwan, and then, in unison with counter air forces, push to the west. On the US air commander's timetable, the US could flood the sky with decoys and drones flying west, further degrading the PLAAF ability to counter the temporary ebb of the air war.
Closely evaluating the counter air portion of the COA, the benefits of agile combat air power can be seen. The inherent agility of air power would allow the US to take the offensive when and where desired. US air forces would only be threatened at the time and place of their choosing and would be relatively secure otherwise. By setting the tempo of the operation, US air forces would be able to engage surface targets in desired order; for example, they could engage SAM and AAA shooters first with a stand-off weapon equipped strike package, followed rapidly by another air strike package attacking undefended amphibious ships with more conventional weapons. The time between attack "cycles" allow the PRC an opportunity to turn the amphibious force around and de-escalate the conflict. On the negative side, synchronizing counter air "pushes" to the west, with timed strike packages generated by aircraft carriers would be an extremely complex operation. Any delay in flight operations on either carrier would have ripple effects for the whole operation, lowering the total number of sorties that would be able to engage the surface fleet. Additionally, low flying "wedge" operations (if the SA-20s are left intact) could expose unwary aircrew to AAA and low altitude SAM threats.
Overall, the COA described for this scenario would maintain the operational offensive in a strategically defensive scenario (defense of Taiwan). It would minimize risk to less agile forces such as US surface naval assets while focusing solely on the Chinese COG, the amphibious surface group. This COA would incrementally weaken Chinese offensive capability, allowing the PRC potential exits to combat escalation, giving them an opportunity to "save face" and stop the operation. This ability is critical if the US hopes to restrict the extent of any conflict with the PRC over Taiwan.
There are two major decisions in this COA that warrant further explanation. A submarine task force or a surface attack group might be more effective in attacking the amphibious attack force. Also, instead of focusing on the protection of the carrier groups, one could argue instead that the US should engage the enemy surface fleet in a classic In addition to insufficient force concerns, the US submarines would be subject to a variety of attacks while operating in the Strait. Frosch, interview. in 30 varieties and will use them to surround Taiwan. 40 Because the submarines would have to engage so many targets, potentially giving away their position each time, the Chinese surface protection group will have more opportunities to attack the US submarines. The primary COA would allow greater self-protection for the attack submarines, because they would only need to destroy the four key destroyers and then completely leave the area.
Mahan might argue to use the US surface fleet in an aggressive role, attacking either the amphibious group or the anti-access surface group in a traditional fleet-on fleet naval
battle. There are several problems with this COA, the most important being fleet protection.
The PRC has invested heavily in sea-denial weaponry. Most notable is the growing PRC submarine force that could put to sea "…50 modern-to-moderate attack submarines…more submarines than the US Navy can locate and counter." 41 A surface attack force running throughout the Taiwan Strait area could stumble over these (50) modern attack submarines as well as the 50,000 plus PLAN mines. The PRC have been modernizing their ballistic missiles, increasing their accuracy to potentially target US warships. 42 Any US surface group venturing too close to the mainland would also need to concern itself with potential PLAAF attacks. Air power's inherent agility would favor the PLAAF in this scenario because once any US surface force were located in range of the mainland, the Chinese could mass air power to temporarily overwhelm the fleet's air defenses. The PLAAF could attack US surface groups within SA-20 protection ranges negating fleet airborne defense capabilities (see Figure 2) . In summation, the PRC would most likely win battles for sea control in a 2010 short duration conflict scenario, because the PLAN will have propositioned In addition to the US fleet protection issue, the fleet-on-fleet sea control battle would immediately escalate the conflict. Both superpowers might well sustain major losses in such a battle, regardless of apparent victor. With limited US objectives seeking to avoid escalation, a major battle with large potential for loss of blood and treasure for ultimate "control of the sea" would be completely unsuitable against a nuclear-capable superpower adversary.
CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
In a 2010 PRC invasion of Taiwan short duration conflict, Mitchell's airpower theories might prove more relevant than Mahan's for the US operational commander.
Focused and incremental force application using air power against the PRC's center of gravity would prove more effective in achieving overall US national objectives of defending Taiwan while avoiding escalation. Additionally, because only limited forces might be available to the operational commander in this scenario, the economic use of combat power will be paramount. Achieving limited local air superiority over the decisive point in the Taiwan Strait would enable US air power to neutralize the PRC center of gravity, the amphibious landing force, for the short duration conflict scenario.
The following recommendations would assist the US operational commander in a Taiwan Strait short duration conflict. By implementing these recommendations, US leaders would greatly improve the operational situation faced in a Taiwan Strait confrontation and might be able to deter any PRC aggression before any conflict begins.
US leaders must closely monitor and if necessary, attempt to politically limit, the types of SAMs the PRC acquires. Extremely long range, over-the-horizon capable, antistealth SAMs being developed in Russia (discussed previously) sold to the PRC would completely solidify its anti-access capability over Taiwan.
The US should pre-position a larger percentage of our best conventional military assets (F-22s, attack submarines, aircraft carriers) to the west. The short duration conflict against the PRC is the most likely large-scale conventional scenario in the next 10 years.
Finally, US national leadership should respond quickly and appropriately to any PRC activities which indicate they intend to execute the short duration conflict. Appropriate responses to PRC actions are implied by the COA examined previously. The mere threat of the capability to defeat PRC anti-access forces might be enough to deter any PRC invasion.
For example, as political tensions rise in the Strait, US leaders could announce the deployment of 10 attack submarines to the area. One submarine could find and (visible to the PRC) track the LUZHOUs. Excessive PLAAF air activity could be countered with a rapid F-22 deployment to Guam. If the PRC's ability to protect an amphibious force is uncertain, it will likely back down.
By understanding critical PRC anti-access capabilities and showing a desire and capacity to defeat them with the COA described above, the US operational commander will be capable of deterring, then defeating the PRC in a short duration conflict scenario. 
